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ABSTRACT 
This paper proposes a framework for establishing quantitative measures and mathematically reproducible 
definitions of structural resiliency as it pertains to a structure's ability to minimize the potential for undesirable 
response to low-probability-high-consequence events. The resiliency assessment and design process follow a 
logical progression of steps starting with the characterization of hazards and continuing through analysis 
simulations, damage modeling, and loss assessment by balancing functional relationships between design 
tradeoffs and associated consequences. The outcomes of each subprocess are articulated through a series of 
generalized variables: topology, geometry, damage, and hazard intensity measures. A rigorous probabilistic 
framework permits consistent characterization of the inherent uncertainties throughout the process. The 
proposed framework is well suited to support the building design process through stochastic characterization of 
assessment measures. Using a stepwise approach, the framework facilitates a systemwide method to confront 
multihazard threat scenarios by establishing functional relationships between the development of appropriate 
models, design methods, damage acceptance criteria, and tools necessary for implementation. The proposed 
methodology can be implemented directly for assessment of project-specific performance criteria or can be used 
as a basis for establishing appropriate performance criteria and provisions to achieve resilient structural 
solutions at the outset of design. 
1. INTRODUCTION 
The recent past has witnessed unprecedented levels 
of structural failures in response to extreme loading 
events and structural deterioration. Despite 
engineers’ efforts to implement an elevated level of 
design, these incidents have highlighted the 
significant threat to our built environment posed by 
low-probability-high-consequence events and the 
shortcomings of conventional design approaches in 
providing an effective engineering process to 
confront failure propagation as part of the design 
process. Emerging trends in the engineering 
community suggest the problem is rooted in the 
misnomer of achieving a “collapse proof” structure 
using design approaches that address a limited 
range of performance in response to specific 
extreme loading conditions to incrementally increase 
resistance. The resulting design, however, may be 
unable to cope with even slight variability in the initial 
design assumptions or structural response. 
Given the need to preserve building functionality, 
designers are turning to concepts of resiliency which 
stress the need for a system to resist, adapt to, and 
recover from exposure to a broad range of hazards. 
The resiliency of a system is measured by its ability to 
mitigate the effects of an extreme load and minimize 
the recovery needed to restore functionality. The 
concept of resilience is applicable at multiple levels 
within the scale of the built environment, progressing 
from structural components to single structures to 
networks of structures to entire communities. 
Evaluations of resilience at each level are critical to the 
overall ability of our infrastructure to withstand and 
recover from extreme events. The framework 
developed in this paper will focus on the resilience of a 
single structure to blast loads and potential local 
damage. Frameworks at the structure level can then 
be used to provide input for resilience models at the 
network and community level. 
This paper outlines a decision-based framework by 
which the magnitude of the consequences to blast-
induced local damage can be calculated and used to 
assess structural resiliency. Current models define 
system resiliency as the time to full (or nearly full) 
recovery after a shock, insult, or disturbance (i.e., 
hazards). In this context, it is difficult to understand the 
engineering process by which to evaluate and 
implement resilience as part of the design process. 
This paper proposes an alternate definition of 
resilience in which the amount of required recovery is 
correlated with the amount and severity of damage 
inflicted by an air-blast threat. In this framework, the 
user determines the likely damage for a range of 
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increasing threats and decides whether the 
corresponding consequences based on the sequence 
of damage (which quantifies the resilience) is 
acceptable. Current performance-based 
methodologies are reviewed and adapted to provide a 
procedural framework that is multideterministic and, 
therefore, more accessible to engineers who rely on 
the current state of practice. The mathematical 
formulation of the proposed approach is discussed, 
and a design example is provided in which the 
proposed framework is demonstrated. 
2. RESILIENCE VERSUS ROBUSTNESS 
The key issue confronted by collapse-resistant design 
approaches is the formulation of a building solution to 
resist an unexpected and unpredictable event without 
a priori knowledge of the location of the local damage 
and, thus, the building’s load redistribution 
requirements. At the epicenter of progressive collapse 
theories and design practice is the concept of 
robustness. This quality of a structural system 
characterizes the extent to which stability can be 
maintained when equilibrium is perturbed. Collapse-
resistant design is essentially the practice of 
calculating structural robustness and enhancing the 
ability of the building to cope with extreme load 
conditions where it is necessary. 
Lacking clear guidance in how to achieve robustness, 
engineers have extended their understanding of 
conventional structural theories in the pursuit of 
collapse-resistant design. The predominant technical 
methods employed in this exercise are deterministic in 
nature and rely on a series of assumptions to reconcile 
unknowns associated with damage scenarios, initial 
conditions that define system resistance, and 
observed variability in structural performance at the 
brink of collapse and provide an achievable path to 
implement collapse resistance. The design process is 
largely characterized by a component-by-component 
validation of the structure and subsequent local 
strengthening of the system until a prescribed level of 
robustness is achieved. This process is predicated on 
the assumption that robustness is a variable property 
of the structure, correlated to strength and load path 
redundancy. However, observed structural behavior in 
the aftermath of extreme loading events contradicts 
this assumption. There are many examples where 
seemingly highly redundant structures have failed and, 
conversely, where expected building failure was not 
observed. 
This paper argues that the disparity between expected 
and observed building performance is rooted in the 
assumption that strength-based methods, applied at 
the component level effectively, will adequately alter 
the global resistance from which structural robustness 
is derived. Rather than consider the resistance as a 
sliding scale in relation to a fixed load, the proposed 
alternative is to consider robustness as a fixed 
property of the system that is uniquely tied to the 
structural configuration as expressed in Equation 1:  
Robustness = f(topology, geometry)  (1) 
In this formulation of robustness, “topology” refers to 
the building shell configuration relative to the site. This 
property defines the expected exposure of the building 
to widespread or local concentrations of extreme 
loads. The "geometry" term refers to the layout of the 
structural load-bearing elements. Both are absolute 
properties that cannot be changed without 
modifications to the overall building configuration. In 
this way, once the building system's geometry has 
been defined, so too has the structure's robustness. 
If robustness is held to be an absolute property of the 
system, then resilience represents the variable 
property that fluctuates with specific design decisions. 
Pursuit of resilience is typically considered to be an 
exercise in balancing the ability of a given structure to 
resist, adapt to, and recover from extreme events (see 
Equation 2). The “resistance” component of Equation 2 
represents engineering effort to withstand a prescribed 
hazard. Load resistance allows the structure to 
achieve rapid recovery to a wide range of threats by 
avoiding damage. However, even robust structures 
may experience some damage when subject to design 
levels of extreme loads. To resist blast loads, building 
elements are designed to experience allowable levels 
of plastic deformation or cracking. Even if element 
“failure” (i.e., collapse) is avoided, damaged elements 
will require repair or replacement resulting in a 
temporary loss of building functionality. Resistance 
should therefore be provided, such that potential 
damage minimizes casualties and reduces the 
likelihood of catastrophic structural losses. The 
“adaptation” component is largely understood to 
consist of high-level emergency planning efforts to 
restore facility function in the aftermath of a 
catastrophe. The “recovery” component represents the 
process over time in which facility function is restored 
via repair and/or replacement. The perceived balance 
of these variables as it impacts system resilience is 
visually depicted in Figure 1 which plots functionality 
on a time scale. 
Equation 3 revises the common expression of 
resilience to exclude the recovery and adaptation 
components, as these parameters cannot be easily 
quantified as part of engineering design efforts. The 
resistance component of resilience is broken into 
robustness and hazard parameters. 
Resilience = f(resistance, adaptation, recovery) (2) 
Resilience = f(hazard, robustness) =  
= f(hazard, topology, geometry)  (3) 
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In this modified expression of resilience, the structural 
performance associated with a specific system 
configuration is considered to be independent from the 
contribution of component strengthening to address a 
prescribed load or hazard. The resulting equation for 
resilience represents the specific hazard magnitude 
mitigated by a structural design with an assigned 
robustness. This definition of resilience allows 
engineers to quantify resilience and robustness in 
more certain terms and provides a basis to better 
assess post-event structural behavior. By extension, 
resilience, R, can be expressed mathematically as the 
normalized integration of the functionality, Q, as shown 
in Figure 1 (Bocchini & Frangopol, 2012), in which Q is 
represented as a function of topology, T; geometry, G; 

















3. PROPOSED RESILIENCY FRAMEWORK 
The proposed framework is centered on a 
performance-based calculation of the consequences 
due to blast-induced local damage. The 
consequences, C, quantify the loss of functionality 
which constitutes the initial condition needed for 
integration in Equation 4. As a starting point, a risk-
based integration based on the total probability 
theorem is constructed, similar to that used by several 
stochastic performance-based approaches (Barbato, 
Petrini, Unnikrishnan &, 2013; FEMA, 2012), to 
calculate the likely magnitude of the consequences 











Where G(…|…) is the conditional cumulative 
distribution function; p(…|…) is the conditional 
probability density function; T is the threat location  
 
Figure 1. Graphical representation of functional recovery following 
an extreme event which causes damage 
and size (accounting for the standoff and orientation 
of the explosive threat to the structure as well as its 
charge weight); IM is the intensity measure (i.e., the 
magnitude of blast pressure and impulse due to the 
threat); ERP is the engineering response parameter 
(such as ductility, rotation, shear, or breach) due to 
the IMs and Ts; DM is the direct damage caused by 
the blast according to the ERPs; and C is the 
consequence of the damage (i.e., the resulting 
structural and/or functional losses). Equation 5 is 
solved by sequentially solving for the probability of 
exceedance for each successive parameter by 
integrating its probability density function as 
conditional of the upstream parameters. To achieve a 
quantitative solution, a conditional probability density 
function must, therefore, be developed, available, or 
assumed for each step of integration. 
To reduce the number of required probability density 
functions, Equation 5 can be simplified by selectively 
designating some of the parameters as deterministic 
variables. The IM at every target on the structure can 
be assumed to be a deterministic function of the 
threat location and size, as is commonly done in 
blast engineering practice (DoD, 2008). If threats are 
examined one at a time, then the probability of DM 
becomes directly correlated to the IM and the 
integration over T is eliminated. Also, the integration 
over ERP can be eliminated if deterministic, 
predefined response limits are chosen (i.e., 
variability in the ERP is removed): 
 ⋅⋅⋅= dIMdDMIMDMpDMCGc )|()|()(λ  (6) 
Equation 6 is used to evaluate the consequences for 
each threat location which can then be compared 
either graphically or numerically for all likely or 
potential threat locations. Even though its integration 
has been simplified, Equation 6 still requires that the 
user provide probabilistic functions relating the 
damage to the blast effects as well as the 
consequences given the damage. To complete the 
transition toward using deterministic rather than 
probabilistic methods, we can replace the 
probabilistic functions G(C|DM) and p(DM|IM) with 
direct functions for C and DM. As is done in practice, 
DM can be considered to be a deterministic function 
of the exceedance of the ERP by the corresponding 
IM. DM(IM) can be calculated using single degree of 
freedom analysis of the elements (DoD, 2008) 
according to response limits representing “failure” 
(USACE, 2006). The function for C describes the 
increase of consequences as a function of the 
pattern of DM (i.e., as a function of DM given IM). 
C(DM|IM) is a user-defined function that describes 
the increasing amount of structural loss (and 
therefore functional loss) associated with the location 
and extent of damage. The calculated value for total 


























 ⋅⋅⋅= dIMdDMIMDMIMDMGTC )()|()(  (7) 
The functions within the double integral in Equation 7 
represent a surface that graphically describes the 
overall consequences in response to increase threat 
intensity for the given threat and geometry. The 
volume under this surface is calculated via the 
double integration and represents the initial condition 
for the calculation of resilience, R. If the shape of 
functionality Q in Figure 1 and Equation 4 is 
assumed to include an instantaneous drop of 
magnitude, λ(C), due to an extreme event at time, t0, 
and is followed by a linear recovery to full 
functionality at time, tr, then Equation 4 can be 


























1R(T)   (8) 
If the rate of recovery is assumed to be independent 
of the magnitude or type of functionality loss, the 
resilience can be more simply calculated as 
inversely proportional to the consequences that 




TR ≈      (9) 
The framework proposed in this paper establishes a 
correlation between the pattern and sequence of 
damage due to the spatial distribution of blast effects 
on the building envelope to the resulting 
consequences. In other words, the consequences in 
terms of structural loss are governed by the order 
and location of element failure as the intensity of the 
blast threat increases. By developing the 
consequences as a function of the damage due to 
the distribution of threat intensity (i.e., C(DM|IM)), the 
relative resilience of the building to damage caused 
by a range of threat intensities (i.e., DM(IM)) can be 
evaluated. 
4. EXAMPLE 
A simplified design example is provided to illustrate 
the implementation of the proposed resilient 
framework in the context of blast-resistant building 
design. Two levels of structural robustness are 
considered in which the frame is (1) not explicitly 
designed to resist local damage (i.e., conventional 
construction) and (2) designed to bridge over the 
loss of a single one-story column (i.e., current 
progressive collapse resistant design). 
This example, ultimately, demonstrates the process 
by which resilience can be assessed and high-level 
design decisions can be made regarding structural 
system configuration as part of early stages of the 
design process where a fixed threat is considered.  
 
Figure 2. Example 2-D, 5-story frame 
4.1. Site Layout—Topology 
The prototype structure used to illustrate the 
proposed framework to calculate resilience is a two-
dimensional, 5-story frame, as shown in Figure 2. 
The column grid is numbered consecutively from left 
to right starting from Grid A to Grid J. Columns are 
spaced at 9 meters; story height is fixed at 4.5 
meters. As indicated previously, all columns are 
assumed to be characterized by the same material 
and section properties such that the same blast load 
intensity will cause an exceedance of the selected 
ERP of any one column. In practice, variable 
element design would be accounted for in 
determining the sequence in which failure 
propagates from one column to the next given the IM 
distribution. 
4.2. Threat Locations and IM—Hazard 
For this example, three explosive weapon threats 
were considered. All threats are equal in magnitude 
and plan-dimension offset from the frame. The 
threats’ locations are as followed and were selected 
to be consistent with current progressive collapse 
practice of targeting critical ground level columns: 
• TL-1: Threat located at the end bay column 
A-1. 
• TL-2: Threat located at the interior bay 
column E-1, which is approximately 
middimension of the frame. 
• TL-3: Threat is located at the center of the 
interior bay bound by columns E-1 and F-1 
and represents the threat considered to 
result in potential simultaneous failure of two 
first floor columns. 
For the purpose of illustrating the procedure of the 
proposed framework, we will first focus on TL-3. 
Figure 3 depicts a scatter plot of air-blast pressures 
and impulses (i.e., the blast intensity measure) for 
each column (e.g., E-1 is column line E at story 1) for 
TL-3. In Figure. 5, the points are ordered according 
to descending intensity as a percentage of the 
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maximum intensity to identify columns that are 
exposed to the highest magnitude loads. 
4.3. Consequence and Damage—Geometry 
For Structure 2, the acceptable consequence would 
be the loss of functionality only at the two bays 
adjacent to the failure of a single one-story column 
(i.e., preventing collapse of the floors bridging over 
the failed column). The acceptable damage is 
therefore the single column failure. For Structure 1, 
the structure is not explicitly designed to withstand 
any damage and, therefore, no allowable 
consequences or damage has technically been 
chosen. For the purpose of this example, Structure 1 
is used as a comparison of relative resilience to local 
damage to that of Structure 2. 
 
Figure 3. Hazard Intensity Measure (IM) scatter plot for each 
column for TL-3 
 
 
Figure 4. Topology plot of relative IM plot for all columns 
 
 
Figure 5. Geometry plot of consequence function for Structure 1, 
TL-3 (conventional design) 
 
 
Figure 6. Geometry plot of consequence function for Structure 2, 
TL-3 (progressive collapse design) 
4.4. The Sequence of Damage 
Given the assumption that all columns are equal and 
bound by a singular ERP, columns with the greatest 
exposure to extreme loads are considered to also 
experience the greatest extent of damage. In this 
way, the example establishes a direct correlation 
between the DM and IM components of the 
mathematical formulation and simplifies the process 
of assessing damage propagation. As shown in 
Figure 4, for instance, column E-1 is expected to 
experience the highest loads and incur the greatest 
levels of damage. In practice, the IM field can be 
used to assess damage on a component-by-
component basis to establish a design-specific 
correlation between the DM and IM parameters. 
4.5. Damage and Consequence Functions 
In general, the consequence function can be derived 
by rigorous finite element analysis of the structure to 
assess damage propagation given singular element 
failure. However, for the purpose of the illustration of 
the example, the consequence function is derived 
empirically based on the number of frame bays 
attributed to a specific column. In this way, failure of 
an individual column can be deterministically 
correlated to a structural loss measure. Each 
consequence function is unique not only to structure 
but also to threat location. 
Using this method, the two structures of alternate 
robustness—design with and without progressive 
collapse resistance—can be compared in terms of 
consequence. Figure 5 illustrates the consequence 
function for the conventionally designed Structure 1, 
which does not include progressive collapse 
resistance. Failure of a typical interior column is 
assigned a consequence of ten bays lost—the two 
bays immediately adjacent to the column at ground 
level and the eight bays above. The formulation of 
the consequence function additionally considers the 
equal relationship of all columns. Therefore, the 
consequence of column E-5 failure encompasses a 
two-dimensional spread of failed columns below on 
Line E as well as adjacent columns that are 
equidistant or closer to the threat location. 
Figure 6 illustrates a similarly formulated 
consequence function for Structure 2, which does 
include collapse resistance at all column locations. 
Since this structure is able to bridge the loss of any 
single column, failure of one column is only expected 
to result in functional loss at the two adjacent bays. 
However, the propagation of damage that results 
from the failure of two adjacent columns at the same 
story (and beyond) produces the same consequence 
as for Structure 1 since the progressive collapse-
resistant design is not sufficient to address any 
larger extent of damage. 
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4.6. Consequence and Resilience 
An overall consequence measure (CM) can be 
obtained by multiplying the consequence function (C) 
of Figures 5 and 6 with the plot of relative IM portrayed 
in Figure 4, which is directly correlated to the Damage 
Measure (DM) for this example. Figures 7 and 8 show 
the CM surfaces for Structure 1 and Structure 2, 
respectively, for each considered threat location over 
the domain of IM and DM. The consequence C(T) is 
then obtained by calculating the volume under each 







Figure 7. Consequence measure and resilience indicator for 
Structure 1 
Additionally, Figures 7 and 8 indicate a Resilience 
Indicator (RI) for each structure and threat, which is 
a direct estimate of Equation 9. The consequence is 
a summation of the total consequence associated 
with the variable damage field across all elements. 
Thus, a high RI can be achieved through a 
combination of (1) consequence minimization for a 









Figure 8. Consequence measure and resilience indicator for 
Structure 2 
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Examining the results, several key conclusions can 
be made as follows: 
• Structure 1 is most resilient to TL-1 (RI = 
8.54%) and least resilient to TL-2 (RI = 
3.52%). 
• Structure 2 is similarly most resilient to TL-1 
(RI = 19.3%) but is least resilient to TL-3 (RI 
= 6.51%). 
• Structure 2 is generally considered to be 
more resilient than Structure 1. 
• The calculated RI for Structure 2 in response 
to TL-1 and TL-2 is roughly twice that of 
Structure 1, providing a direct measurement 
of the benefit for the design to resist the loss 
of one element. 
• Structure 1 and Structure 2 have the same 
RI for TL-3, which represents the threat 
scenario expected to cause simultaneous 
loss of two columns. 
In general, the structure is only as resilient as the 
weakest link, or, in the case of this example, the RI 
associated with the limiting threat. Therefore, 
Structure 1 and Structure 2 are considered to have 
an RI of 3.52% (TL-2) and 6.51% (TL-3), 
respectively. Based on this assessment, if it is 
desired to elevate Structure 1 to the same level of 
resilience as Structure 2 without implementation of 
progressive collapse design, the design threat for 
Structure 1 needs to be increased by a factor of 1.9 
(6.51/3.52). This will elevate the hazard component 
of the RI formulation to be more proportionate to the 
consequence for this example. 
Based on these results, the structural engineer is 
able to make one of several decisions to dictate the 
final design of the structure: 
1. “No Action”—Proceed with conventional 
design of the frame and accept 
consequence for the specified threats as 
represented in the results for Structure 1. 
2. “Collapse Resistance”—Implement collapse 
resistance and accept the consequence for 
the specified threats as reflected in the 
results for Structure 2. 
“"Selective Strengthening”—Retain the 
configuration of the frame structure but 
selectively strengthen columns to minimize 
damage. This approach will not alter the 
formulation of the consequence function, 
which assumes failure, but results in an 
adjusted Consequence Measure (CM) and 
Resilience Indicator (RI). 
3. “Reconfigure Building”—Alter the 
configuration of the frame. This approach will 
effectively change column orientation 
relative to the threat and result in a different 
Intensity Measure (IM) and Damage 
Measure (DM).  
4. “Reconfigure Site”—Alter the configuration of 
the site. This action will require participation 
of the architect, site planners, and owners to 
change the site layout to mitigate the 
explosive threats. This action would involve 
the relocation of roadway, fences, locations 
of potential screening, or obstructions that 
may hinder surveillance of potential blast 
threat locations. 
Each of these decisions can be framed in the context 
of overall impact to the building design, as well as 
construction cost, to determine the most ideal 
solution to optimize system resilience. 
 
5. CONCLUSIONS AND FUTURE WORK 
This paper outlines a decision-based framework by 
which the magnitude of the consequences to blast-
induced local damage can be calculated and used to 
assess structural resiliency. The procedure for 
resiliency assessment starts with the 
characterization of hazards and calculates the 
resulting damage modeling and functional loss by 
deriving and subsequently balancing functional 
relationships between design and consequences. 
The outcomes of each process are articulated 
through a series of generalized variables, termed as 
topology, geometry, damage and hazard intensity 
measures. The framework is multideterministic and 
therefore more accessible to engineers who rely on 
the current state of practice. A design example using 
a 2-D structural frame was used to demonstrate the 
implementation of the framework. 
The proposed framework has potential to be adapted 
for other hazard types such as impact or fire 
exposure that, like blast, are typically characterized 
by concentrated intensities. To address these 
additional hazards, future work is needed to develop 
methods to calculate the spatial distribution of 
hazard intensity and characterize the resulting 
damage and consequences. Adapting this procedure 
for impact loads would be fairly straightforward since 
most elements that are affected by the impact could 
be evaluated on a pass-fail basis similar to the use 
of performance criteria for blast load. Including fire 
exposure poses a greater challenge since elements 
with thermally induced material weakening and 
restraint of thermal expansion will develop a broader 
spectrum of damage across the structural system. 
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Ideally, the framework would be extended to be 
multihazard to capture the resilience of the structure 
to the entirety of an extreme event (i.e., blast or 
impact followed by fire at the location of damage). In 
a previous study, the authors have examined the 
consequences of fire that follows an initial extreme 
event that results in local damage (Quiel & 
Marjanishvili, 2012), and the incorporation of fire in 
the framework would allow users to leverage studies 
such as these to develop a holistic rather than 
hazard-dependent assessment of structural 
resilience. 
REFERENCES 
American Society of Civil Engineers. (2011). Blast 
protection of buildings (59-11). Reston, VA: 
American Society of Civil Engineers. 
Baker, J. W., Schubert, M., Faber, M. H. (2008). On 
the assessment of robustness. Structural Safety, 
30(3), 253–267. http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/ 
j.strusafe.2006.11.004  
Barbato, M., Petrini, F., Unnikrishnan, V. U., & 
Ciampoli, M. (2013). Performance-based hurricane 
engineering (PBHE) framework. Structural Safety, 
45, 24–35. http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.strusafe. 
2013.07.002  
Bocchini, P., & Frangopol, D. M. (2012). Optimal 
resilience- and cost-based postdisaster 
intervention prioritization for bridges along a 
highway segment. Journal of Bridge Engineering, 
17(1), 117–129. http://dx.doi.org/10.1061/ 
(ASCE)BE.1943-5592.0000201  
Department of Defense. (2008, December 5). 
Structures to resist the effects of accidental 
explosions (UFC 3-340-02). Washington, D.C.: 
U.S. Department of Defense. Retrieved from 
http://www.wbdg.org/ccb/browse_cat.php?c=4  
Department of Defense. (2013). Design of buildings 
to resist progressive collapse (UFC 4-023-03). 
Washington, D.C.: U.S. Department of Defense. 
Retrieved from http://www.wbdg.org/ccb/ 
browse_doc.php?d=4430  
Federal Emergency Management Agency. (2012). 
Seismic performance assessment of buildings 
(FEMA P-58). Washington, D.C.: Federal 
Emergency Management Agency. Retrieved from 
https://www.fema.gov/media-library/assets/ 
documents/90380  
Marjanishvili, S., Katz, B., & Hinman, E. (2012). 
Current analysis methods and structural collapse 
mitigation. In A. M. Dolhon, M. J. Drerup, A. D. de 
Len, J. B. Kardon, D.S. Hancock, & S. -e. Chen 
(Eds.) Forensic Engineering 2012 (pp. 881–890). 
San Francisco, CA: American Society of Civil 
Engineers. http://dx.doi.org/10.1061/ 
9780784412640.093  
MathWorks. (2013). MATLAB [computer software]. 
Natick, MA: MathWorks. 
McAllister, T. (2013). Developing guidelines and 
standards for disaster resilience of the built 
environment: A research needs assessment (NIST-
TN-1795). Gaithersburg, MD: National Institute of 
Standards and Technology. http://dx.doi.org/ 
10.6028/NIST.TN.1795  
Nafday, A. M. (2011). Consequence-based structural 
design approach for black swan events. Structural 
Safety, 33(1), 108–114. http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/ 
j.strusafe.2010.09.003  
Quiel, S. E., & Marjanishvili, S. M. (2012). Fire 
resistance of a damaged steel building frame that 
has been designed to resist progressive collapse. 
Journal of Performance Constructed Facilities, 
26(4), 402–409. http://dx.doi.org/10.1061/ 
(ASCE)CF.1943-5509.0000248  
Technical Support Working Group. (2004). Vehicle 
borne improvised explosive devices in worldwide 
terrorism: A contemporary open source analysis. 
Washington, D.C.: U.S. Department of Defense. 
U.S. Army Corps of Engineers. (2008). Single 
degree of freedom structural response limits for 
antiterrorism design (PDC-TR 06-08). Vicksburg, 
MS: U.S. Army Corps of Engineers. Retrieved from 
https://pdc.usace.army.mil/library/tr/06-08  
U.S. General Services Administration. (2003). 
Progressive collapse analysis and design 
guidelines for new federal office buildings and 
major modernization projects [PDF]. Washington, 
D.C.: U.S. General Services Administration. 
Retrieved from http://www.ara.com/Projects/ 
docs/PCADG.pdf  
Whittaker, A., Hamburger, R., & Mahoney, M. (2003). 
Performance-based engineering of buildings for 
extreme events. In AISC-SINY symposium on 
resisting blast and progressive collapse. New York, 
NY: American Institute of Steel Construction.
 
 
 
